ObamaCare Problematic Theory

This At-Will Ability To Regulate

Kevin A. Sensenig | July 7, 2014 | Updated August 22, 2014

There are several highlights to my argument about this very uh problematic premise to ObamaCare's design:

1.  Any "economic activity" that has a "significant effect" on interstate commerce is subject to federal regulation, and this is Verrilli's own argument.

2. 2. The Constitution specified for the federal government that Congress could regulate "interstate Commerce".  There are several aspects to this.
   

1. a)Commerce capital-C must be understood clearly as a "thing", a "thing" as very real, and can be considered as such.  This is an important philosophical point.  It is also very very practical.
   

2. b)Commerce capital-C as a "thing" must be considered as the States capital-S are understood as "bodies" — function, form, body, tangible features, dimension, requirements, etc.  And these States are to work as bodies one with the other.
   

100. c)The Constitution does not specify that the federal government can regulate "economic activity", it says "interstate Commerce".  The argument Verrilli makes (and I quote this in my online nxmvc paper again at http://www.nxmvc.com/TN.02.html) is that economic activity is the thing that can be regulated; that is, if a product or an individual or a company has the aspect of commerce, measurable by "economic activity", then that entire individual, product, or company can be regulated.  This is different from saying that if a product or company has the aspect of commerce, then that commerce can be regulated (but not the individual, product itself, or company).
     

500. d)ObamaCare specifies function and structure for the insurance companies.  This is national socialism, when combined especially with the "to regulate economic activity" (which everyone touches) and by the logic of (which everyone touches), all individuals and companies and so forth can be regulated, since almost anything and also specifics can be defined to have an effect on interstate commerce (specifically or as an aggregate), whether action or no action, awareness or not, informed consent or not, etc.
     

5. e)This broad warp of to cast everything as "economic activity" which has a "significant effect" on interstate commerce is to be of no internal limit, that is the principle itself can be applied at will.
   

6. f)Again, the regulation so spoken of by Verrilli can be applied at will, by what Verrilli calls the "national government" (he doesn't even pretend anymore that it's the "federal government" and all that implies (entity, clear domain of responsibility and power, of the States, of the People (Congress))).
   

g) Again, Congress can regulate the commerce aspect of interstate Commerce; and it's clearly also the "interstate" part of this Commerce, understood as a thing itself.

I don't see why the national socialist principle of this at-will ability to regulate this that and the other thing can't also be applied to books.  It's free speech, the argument will go, but the national government will have the vested interest (in the interest of the public) to ensure that the actual books bought (not the speech itself) are accurate and informed.  I am serious.  You can caricature this, or apply the logic to other things.

It could for example apply to gym membership.  This is the same as Scalia’s argument in 2012.

For an introduction in PDF to the basic nature of the problematic theory of ObamaCare, see TN.04.